



Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits' Political Activity?

Author(s): Mark Chaves, Laura Stephens, Joseph Galaskiewicz

Source: *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 292-316

Published by: [American Sociological Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593088>

Accessed: 14/10/2010 17:12

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *American Sociological Review*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits' Political Activity?

Mark Chaves
University of Arizona

Laura Stephens
University of Arizona

Joseph Galaskiewicz
University of Arizona

Autonomy from the state has been considered a core feature of American civil society, and understanding the consequences of perceived threats to that autonomy has been a central theme in social and political theory. We engage this theme by examining a specific question: What is the effect of government funding on nonprofit organizations' political activity? Extant theory and research identify some mechanisms by which government funding might reduce nonprofit political activity and other mechanisms by which government funding might enhance such activity. We investigate this relationship with two data sets: a national sample of religious congregations and a longitudinal sample of nonprofit organizations in Minneapolis–St. Paul. Results across these data sets are consistent and compelling: The relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity is either positive or null; government funding does not suppress nonprofit political activity.

At least since de Tocqueville, autonomy from the state has been considered a core feature of American civil society and a source of its many virtues. Recent historical and sociological research, however, shows that civil society and the state are deeply intertwined (Salamon 1995; Skocpol 1999; Smith and Lipsky 1993). Indeed, from some perspectives, it is more accurate to say that at least parts of civil society are dependent on the state rather than autonomous from it, prompting questions about the conse-

quences of that dependence for the nature and functioning of civil society. But “dependence” and “autonomy,” not to mention “civil society,” are vague concepts that require specification to develop sound knowledge about the consequences for civil society of more or less dependence on or autonomy from the state. We contribute to knowledge about this relationship by focusing on a specific sector of civil society (nonprofit organizations), a specific form of dependence on the state (government funding),

Direct correspondence to Mark Chaves, Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ, 85721-0027 (mchaves@u.arizona.edu). Data collection for the National Congregations Study was supported by a major grant from Lilly Endowment, Inc., and by grants from Smith Richardson Foundation, Inc., the Louisville Institute, the Nonprofit Sector Research Fund of the Aspen Institute, and the Henry Luce Foundation, Inc. Data collection for the Twin Cities project was mainly supported by the National Science Foundation (SES 80–08570, SES 83–19364, SES

88–12702, and SES 93–20929), and also by the Program on Nonprofit Organizations at Yale University, the Nonprofit Sector Research Fund of the Aspen Institute, the Northwest Area Foundation of St. Paul, the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs at the University of Minnesota, the Graduate School at the University of Minnesota, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the American Association of Colleges. The authors thank *ASR* reviewers, Steven Smith, Burt Weisbrod, and participants in the University of Arizona’s Social Organizations Seminar for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

and a specific type of consequence that might flow from variations in dependence on government (amount of political activity).

Many nonprofit organizations depend on government funding, and this financial dependence on public money has increased in recent decades as more government funded services are delivered via grants and contracts with non-governmental organizations.¹ In 1997, government funding accounted for 37 percent of the nonprofit sector's revenue, up from 31 percent in 1977 (Salamon 2002). The extent of this financial dependence on government varies considerably across types of nonprofit organizations, but few types receive no government funding. Even among religious congregations, 3 percent receive government money in support of social service activity (Chaves 1999). There is a substantial empirical and normative literature on the nature and implications of financial connections between government and nonprofit organizations (Boris and Steuerle 1999; Grønbjerg 1993; Salamon 1995; Smith and Lipsky 1993).

Nonprofit organizations also play an important advocacy role in American civil society (Berry 2003; Boris and Krehely 2002; Jenkins 1987; Reid 1999). They have provided a vehicle, at least somewhat distinct from corporations, government, and political parties, through which individuals voice concerns and attempt to exert collective influence on political processes. Nonprofit advocacy takes many forms, including litigating, lobbying, researching, publishing, testifying, and organizing collective actions. Political activity is the primary purpose of some nonprofit organizations, such as the National Rifle Association or the National Organization for Women. But many other nonprofit organizations, whose primary purpose is

something other than political advocacy (e.g., social service agencies or religious congregations), also engage in political activity on occasion. We focus here on the latter type of organization: nonprofits whose primary purpose is something other than political activity.²

Substantial government support of nonprofit organizations raises important questions about the consequences of this support for nonprofits' political activity. Are government funding and political activity competing or complementary features of nonprofit organizations? Do government-supported nonprofits engage in politics as actively as those nonprofit organizations that do not receive government support? Most broadly, does the current trajectory of welfare-state development toward contracting out services rather than providing them directly threaten to undermine historically important forms of nonprofit-based political activity in American society? Understanding the nature of American civil society, especially in the context of substantial contracting out of government functions and ongoing concern about declining civic engagement and political participation, requires answering these questions about the consequences of financial dependence on government for political activity in the nonprofit sector.

This issue has been particularly visible in debates over the current Bush Administration's "faith-based" or "charitable choice" initiatives aimed at redirecting public funds to further support congregations' and other religious organizations' social service activities. Some critics of these initiatives have expressed concern that increased availability of public funds for religious organizations' social service activity will dampen religious organizations' "prophetic voice" by increasing their financial dependence on government (e.g., Wallis 2001). This concern is a special case of the more general concern expressed by Salamon (1995) that government funding might threaten nonprofit organizations with a "loss of autonomy or inde-

¹ In this paper, "nonprofit organization" refers to the "religious, educational, charitable, scientific, and literary" organizations encompassed by category 501(c)(3) of the United States tax code and therefore eligible to receive tax deductible contributions. Conceptually, religious congregations are "nonprofit" because they are eligible for tax deductible contributions, even if they are not officially registered as 501(c)(3) organizations with the Internal Revenue Service. Approximately three quarters of congregations have formal 501(c)(3) status, either through their denominations or on their own.

² In terms of Internal Revenue Service categories, our focus is on 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, not on 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations. The latter are tax exempt, but contributions to them are not tax deductible, and nonpartisan political activity may be the organization's exclusive activity.

pendence, particularly [with] dilution of the sector's advocacy role" (p. 103). Our investigation of government funding's effect on nonprofit political activity is motivated, on the one hand, by general theoretical interest in the interplay between the nonprofit sector's advocacy role and its deep entanglement with government and, on the other hand, by a specific policy debate about the consequences for religious organizations' political activities of potentially increased access to government funding. Our results speak both to this specific debate and to deeper and more longstanding theoretical issues concerning the consequences for civil society of more or less autonomy from the state.

Despite its theoretical and policy importance, little systematic research has focused on the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity. This connection has been explored directly only through case studies (e.g., Fish 1973; Harris 2001; Helfgot 1974; Nowland-Foreman 1998), small-N comparative case studies (e.g., Gittell 1980; Kramer 1981; Kramer and Grossman 1987), and one survey of nonprofits large enough to submit financial returns to the IRS (Berry 2003).³ The connection has been explored indirectly through surveys of nonprofit board members' individual political activity (O'Regan and Oster 2002) and surveys of executive directors' subjective assessments of how government funding affects their organizations' autonomy (e.g., Netting 1982; Monsma 1996).⁴ Claims of any sort about the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity currently rest

³ Only 42 percent of all organizations registered with the IRS as 501(c)(3) nonprofits submit financial returns. In Indiana, the only state for which relevant comparisons have been made, the nonprofits submitting financial returns constitute only 10 percent of the total nonprofit population (Grønberg 2002:1747, 1772). Nonprofit organizations with less than \$5,000 in annual revenue are not required to register with the IRS; organizations with less than \$25,000 in annual revenue are not required to submit a financial return (Form 990). Religious congregations are not required to register or submit financial returns whatever their size.

⁴ The initial wave of this research (e.g., Fish 1973; Gittell 1980; Helfgot 1974) examined the dilemmas of political activity faced by 1960s' community organizations that received public funds.

on a very thin empirical base. We examine the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity by measuring the key variables in two organizational samples, each of which represents the full size range of the relevant population (not just the biggest organizations), and each of which enables us to assess this relationship in the presence of relevant statistical controls. One of these samples is a panel study, which allows us to introduce a longitudinal dimension in our analysis.

We begin by drawing on existing theory and research to build a simple theoretical model of the relationship between government funding and levels of nonprofit political activity. Although the existing literature helps us to identify plausible mechanisms by which government funding might affect nonprofit political activity, it does not yield an unambiguous answer to a basic question about the direction of that relationship: Does government funding suppress, enhance, or have no effect on nonprofits' political activity? We address this question with a nationally representative sample of religious congregations and a longitudinal representative sample of nonprofit organizations in Minneapolis–St. Paul. We obtain strikingly consistent results.

BACKGROUND AND THEORY

Investigating the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity is complicated by variation in the goals nonprofit organizations pursue through political activity, the tactics they employ in pursuit of those goals, and the types of nonprofit organization engaging in political activity. Nonprofit organizations might use letter-writing and telephone campaigns directed at legislators to advocate on behalf of an interest group; they might testify at legislative hearings or mobilize individuals to demonstrate at a state capitol to influence policy on behalf of a client population that they serve; they might promote a particular mission by supporting or resisting particular policies or legislative agendas; they might engage in nonpartisan public education around political issues; they might endorse political candidates; or they might sponsor demonstrations and marches. Although this is not an exhaustive list of the political activities in which nonprofits might

engage, it illustrates the range of goals, tactics, and organizational types encompassed by nonprofit political activity. We might expect government funding to have different consequences across types of nonprofit organizations, political goals, and tactics.

We focus on nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is something other than political activity or advocacy, but this restriction still leaves substantial variation in organizational types and in political goals and tactics. We are not able to comprehensively study the effects of government funding on every type of political activity across every type of nonprofit organization. We are, however, able to measure a range of political activities among a variety of types of nonprofit organization. Since distinguishing among different types of political activities and different types of nonprofits does not, within the limits of our data and measures, produce importantly different results, we will, in this section, use an undifferentiated concept of "political activity" and an undifferentiated category of "nonprofit organization" rather than distinguish specific types of political activity and specific sorts of organizations.

HOW GOVERNMENT FUNDING MIGHT SUPPRESS NONPROFIT POLITICAL ACTIVITY

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE. The most obvious and direct mechanism by which government funding might suppress nonprofits' political activity is straightforward, don't-bite-the-hand-that-feeds-you resource dependence. That is, nonprofits that depend on government for part of their livelihood might refrain from oppositional political activity or advocacy not welcomed by that funding source. As Wolch (1990) put it: "As public funding becomes more central to organizational survival, these groups may be essentially co-opted and become quiescent" (p. 215). This clearly happens in some times and places. Harris (2001), for example, traced the relative passivity of some of Chicago's major African American churches during the Civil Rights Movement to their financial dependence on Mayor Richard Daley's patronage, noting that the mayor "used the largess of federal monies designated for Johnson's War on Poverty and the city's department of Human Services to undermine clergy dissent" (p. 153). And nonprofit executives sometimes report examples

of outright punishment for advocacy by such means as reducing the number of clients referred to the agency, excluding the organization from important meetings, and discontinuing grant support (Ryan, Miller, and Weiss 2002:14).

Instances of outright punishment (or threat of punishment) by government funders for political activity may be rare, but that rarity does not prevent nonprofit executives from worrying about the potential negative consequences of political activity. Nonprofit leaders sometimes express both anxiety over the loss of autonomy they fear will come with government money and fear that their political activity will drive away government funders (Monsma 1996; Netting 1982; Reid 1999:301–2). One case study described an organization that eventually split into two separate organizations—one for political advocacy and the other to receive government funding—because of perceived "tensions between [the organization's] history of advocacy and its role as a government contractor" (Stone 1996:79). The organization wanted to continue its political work, but it "was obviously reluctant to bite the hand that fed them, as one interviewee reported" (p. 79). And a recently produced pamphlet intended to help religious organizations assess whether they should pursue government funds in support of social service activity simply asserts without comment that one of the down sides of doing so is that government money "undermines the traditional role of religion as prophetic critic of government; like every other government-subsidized group, religion will be less likely to bite the hand that feeds it" (*Keeping the Faith*, n.d.:4). There are many such examples (also, Berry 2003:74,106; Hudson 2002:412). They show that at least some nonprofit leaders fear that confrontational political activity will endanger their government funding. In the presence of this assumption, government funding will suppress at least some types of nonprofit political activity, and that suppression will occur even if the assumption is unjustified because actual instances of retribution in response to political activity are rare.

Resource dependence also operates more subtly than via punishment or fear of punishment for unwelcome political activity. Government funding causes several sorts of changes in nonprofit organizational structure and behavior; it shifts board composition and

increases complexity, formalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization (Froelich 1999; Grønberg 1993; Kramer 1981; Smith and Lipsky 1993; Stone 1996). These changes occur as organizations reorient themselves toward their government funders, acquiring or creating the technical expertise and administrative infrastructure necessary to secure, manage, and sustain that funding. Similarly, the case study literature contains examples of nonprofit organizations reducing their political activity because they redirect organizational attention and energy away from advocacy and toward activities necessary to sustain the government funding on which they depend. A qualitative study of nonprofits in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for example, found that increased government funding led nonprofits to redirect attention, energy, and resources away from service delivery and advocacy and toward administrative activities such as grant-writing, fundraising, and documenting the community's need for services. In this way, increased nonprofit reliance on government funding "was changing the nature of their services; it had substantially diminished their capacity to be political" (Alexander, Nank, and Stivers 1999:460). A qualitative study of rape crisis centers and battered women's shelters, to give another example, found that government funding professionalized these organizations and, in the process, "undermined the distinctively private and ideological character of these programs," changing them from agencies that "openly challenged the established political and professional order" to organizations with "more educated, more experienced staff, more client equity, and greater standardization of services" (Smith 1989:227; also see Matthews 1994). These examples illustrate how the formalization and professionalization that accompany government funding can move nonprofit organizations away from political advocacy.

A resource dependence perspective thus suggests at least two paths by which government funding might reduce nonprofits' political activity: via fear of punishment for unwelcome political activity, and via redirecting organizational attention, energy, and resources away from political activity and toward administrative activities made necessary by government funding. This latter mechanism can be understood as a type of coercive isomorphism by which resource

dependence, rather than law, pressures organizations to act in a certain way. Unlike the don't-bite-the-hand-that-feeds-you mechanism, this latter mechanism also implies that government funding would reduce political activity of all sorts, not just activity that challenges the funder.

COMPLEX LEGAL ENVIRONMENT. Legal rules—and, more subtly, (mis)perceptions of legal rules—also might produce a negative relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity, and one by which all sorts of political activity would be negatively affected, not just activities that directly challenge the funder. There are legal limits on the extent to which organizations granted 501(c)(3) status by the United States Internal Revenue Service (and therefore eligible to receive tax deductible donations) may engage in political activity, whether or not they receive government funds. Some activities, such as supporting or opposing candidates running for office, are completely prohibited; other activities, such as lobbying, are permitted as long as they are not a "substantial" part of an organization's activities; still other activities, such as public education or voter registration, may be pursued without limits.

The regulatory situation is more complex for nonprofit organizations receiving government funds. By IRS rules these organizations may not use government funds to directly support lobbying, but they still may engage in lobbying that is supported by other funds. Additional layers of regulation emanate from the Office of Management and Budget, from funding agencies, and from state and local authorities. This legal environment is both uncertain and complex. Recent Congresses, for example, have considered, but so far have failed to pass, legislation that would prohibit all political advocacy by any nonprofit recipient of government grants.⁵

⁵ Motivated by the belief that existing law does not sufficiently regulate nonprofits' political activity, legislators have attempted to further limit the political voice of nonprofits, especially those receiving government funds (Brody and Cordes 1999:159, 162; Reid 1999:316–8). The Istook Amendment, which would further constrain lobbying by organizations receiving government grants, is the best known exam-

Sometimes legal rules have directly coercive consequences for organizations' political activity. Jenkins (1987), for example, describes 1960s Community Action Projects, which "found that federal support was restricted to particular services and imposed strict fiscal controls that frequently collided with advocacy and indigenous mobilization efforts" (p. 304). But beyond the directly coercive effect of anti-advocacy rules attached to government funding streams, the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the legal environment governing the political activity of nonprofit organizations may decrease in a more subtle way the political activity of government-funded nonprofit organizations contemplating political activity. It is rare for a nonprofit organization to face legal sanction because of its political activity, but, as with beliefs that political activity might threaten government funding via retribution, it is common for nonprofit executives and board members to *believe* that accepting government funding legally restricts their political activity more than it actually does.

The widespread worry among nonprofit leaders about the legality of a publicly funded organization engaging in political activity is evident in surveys of nonprofit executives, in case studies, and in the literature and discourse produced by and for nonprofits. A 2000 survey of executives in nonprofits that filed financial returns with the IRS found that two-thirds (68 percent) wrongly believed that their organizations were not allowed to lobby if part of their funding came from the government (Berry 2003). Follow-up interviews with some of these executives confirmed the survey results. One executive's comment was typical both for being incorrect and for being asserted with confidence: "[We can't] be involved in lobbying as a nonprofit because we receive government grants" (Berry 2003:59–60).

A case study of an organization devoted to helping mentally retarded children makes clear that the executive director and the board simply

assumed that accepting state money meant that it had to curtail its political advocacy. Both board members and top managers apparently believed that the organization faced a dilemma: "[H]ow could it lead advocacy efforts against the cuts [in the state's spending on community programs] and still receive more than \$4.0 million dollars from the state?" (Stone 1996:75). They eventually resolved this dilemma by splitting into two organizations—one that would engage in political activity and one that would hold the state contracts.⁶ Perhaps more telling, the Annie E. Casey Foundation sponsored a report called *Tips on Advocacy for Publicly Funded Nonprofits*. This report, explicitly aimed at community groups attracted to political activity but "worried that speaking out will . . . endanger your government contracts or nonprofit status," asserts: "Many agencies that use government money to provide services are concerned that speaking up will endanger their legal status or put philanthropic and government funding in jeopardy" (Duitch n.d.:2–3). Furthermore, some nonprofits that intend to engage in politics decline to accept government funds because they believe the funds will threaten their advocacy. This is illustrated by the founder of a child-advocacy group in Ohio who noted that his organization "won't accept government funds [because] we want to be a pure voice for children" (Hallett 2002:1C).

In the spring of 2003, uncertainty about the legal rules governing the political activity of publicly funded nonprofits was evident in a controversy over what political activities are permitted by the nonprofit operators of federally funded Head Start programs. In the midst of debate in Congress about reauthorization of Head Start, an associate commissioner of the Head Start Bureau in the United States Department of Health and Human Services wrote to all local Head Start programs informing them that, "Your political activities are governed and, in many ways, restricted or limited by Federal law," and telling them that an advocacy group's effort to encourage Head Start

ple of such an effort. It was first introduced to Congress in 1995. For more detailed discussion of the complex legal environment governing nonprofit organizations' political activities, see Reid (1999), Brody and Cordes (1999), and Berry (2003). Our discussion of the legal environment is based on these three sources.

⁶ This is the same schismatic organization mentioned earlier. This example illustrates that resource dependence and legal ambiguity may reinforce each other in pushing government-funded organizations away from political activity.

providers to speak out against aspects of the proposed reauthorization “appears to encourage Head Start programs to use Head Start program funds and/or staff in a manner that is in direct violation of the laws that govern your political activities” (Hill 2003). The advocacy group in question, the National Head Start Association (NHSA), is a nonprofit association of Head Start providers. The president of that association responded with a letter stating that, contrary to the commissioner’s warning, “there is no ‘restriction or limitation’ . . . on a Head Start program or its staff, parents, or board members from expressing views on legislation to Members of Congress . . . provided they do not use federal funds in expressing those views.” She declared that the commissioner’s letter has “had the effect of chilling the exercise of free expression by Head Start programs and their representatives” (Greene 2003).

This example nicely illustrates both aspects of the causal path produced by legal complexity. On the one hand, public funding carries with it some real legal restrictions on an organization’s political activity. On the other hand, there is widespread misunderstanding about just what those restrictions are, and that misunderstanding, especially when exploited by interested actors, induces political caution by nonprofits. The above exchange clearly assumes that Head Start providers’ beliefs about the legal rules attached to their federal funding directly affect their political activity, and it assumes further that many providers believe that they would be wise to refrain from such activity. The associate commissioner is trying to reinforce that belief; the NHSA president is trying to counter it.

Many examples exist, but these few suffice to establish the dual point that government-supported organizations are in a more restrictive legal environment than are other nonprofits when it comes to political activity, and, more importantly, the legal complexities and uncertainties in this arena sometimes cause leaders of publicly funded nonprofits to believe that the legal environment is more restrictive than it really is (also see Reid 1999:301). The consequence is enhanced caution about political activity in the presence of government funding. This causal pathway rests on what nonprofit leaders (who weigh the costs and benefits of organizational political action) believe about the poten-

tial negative consequences of such action for their organizations, and it will operate even if those beliefs are unfounded and alarmist.⁷

HOW GOVERNMENT FUNDING MIGHT ENHANCE NONPROFIT POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Kramer (1987) identified several features of government–nonprofit relations that might be expected to mitigate the suppressing effect of government funding on nonprofit political activity. These include: “the payment-for-service form of most transactions, which involves less control than grants or subsidies; the diversity of voluntary agency income sources, which lessens dependency on any one; the countervailing power of a voluntary agency oligopsony (few sellers) of a service required by a government agency for its clients; political influence of the voluntary agency; and the lack of incentives and capacity for stricter accountability by government” (p. 247). Some of these circumstances, and others not part of this list, might go beyond merely mitigating the potential negative effects of government funding on political activity to set in motion causal chains by which government funding actually *enhances* nonprofit political activity. We focus on two such mechanisms.

MONETARY SELF-INTEREST. Nonprofit leaders whose organizations receive government funding have an objective incentive to increase their participation in the political process to protect or enhance their own funding streams or otherwise improve their working conditions. Of course, nonprofit organizations often advocate on behalf of their client populations whether or not they receive government support to serve those populations. But the incentive to engage in political advocacy increases when organizations receive government funding because many, perhaps most, policy changes aimed at improving the lives of clients also will augment the organization’s resource environment. Nonprofit organizations, like other sorts of organizations,

⁷ There also is substantial misunderstanding among nonprofit leaders concerning the limits placed on nonprofit political activity simply by virtue of being 501(c)(3) organizations, whatever their funding sources. See Berry (2003) for an assessment of this phenomenon.

do not necessarily react passively to their resource environments; they attempt to shape and control those environments. When a government funder is an important part of that environment, we might therefore expect political activity to increase (Galaskiewicz 1985:292).⁸

The case study literature documents that this incentive operates at least in some times and places. In their study of several dozen San Francisco nonprofits, Kramer and Grossman (1987) observed that it was "exceedingly difficult [for government] not to renew a contract if the provider . . . can mobilize community support" (p. 43). Mobilizing "hundreds of elderly or disabled clients to pack a legislative chamber" helped these nonprofits press for additional government funds and more favorable payment systems (Kramer and Grossman 1987:46). Smith (1999) described a politically active social service organization that receives 70 percent of its budget from government and whose "legislative priorities focus on obtaining rate increases for its programs" (p. 196). Nowland-Foreman (1998) studied a nonprofit organization whose government support "did not stop [it from] taking part (and sometimes taking a lead) in lobbying the government, not just or even mainly for its own grants but also about legislation that affected the people it served" (pp. 108–9). Fish (1973) examined a Chicago community organization that engaged intensively in various kinds of political action to obtain and protect its federal funding. Even if a nonprofit organization's government funding is straightforward political patronage, involvement in patronage networks might discourage political activity critical of the patron at the same time as it encourages political activity—voter registration drives, candidate rallies,

and so on—in support of the patron's political machine (Harris 2001). There are many such examples. Receiving government funding clearly creates an incentive for nonprofit political activity, and nonprofit organizations sometimes act on that incentive.

GOVERNMENT DEPENDENCE ON NONPROFITS. Resource dependency between government and nonprofits can be a two-way street. Even if a nonprofit is dependent on government for its funding, government agencies may also depend on that organization to deliver needed services. Government agencies responsible for managing grants and contracts need qualified and capable nongovernmental partners with which to contract. If the number of such partners is limited in a given community or in a given arena, the situation is one of mutual dependence between government and the nonprofit organization(s) that can deliver the service. In a study that quantified the extent of perceived resource dependence between nonprofit organizations and the state of New York, Saidel (1991) found that "public-sector agencies and nonprofit sector organizations reported virtually identical [levels of] resource dependence on each other" (p. 546). In case studies of nonprofit contracting in San Francisco, Kramer and Grossman (1987) found that "more often than not, government is confronted . . . by a market condition in which there are relatively few sellers of social services that government is mandated to supply" (p. 36). In situations of mutual dependence, both government and nonprofits control resources valuable to the other, neither can dominate the other, and government agencies and nonprofit organizations approach each other on more equal terms. Government agencies are less likely to punish unwelcome political activity by terminating contracts, and, moreover, government supported nonprofits have an incentive to engage in political activity that other nonprofits lack. When government is dependent on its nonprofit contractees, government-funded organizations will be more effective than they otherwise might be at using political activity to promote themselves, their clients, or their mission.

⁸ Another version of this argument could be developed by adapting Mueller's (1979:156) account of the "budget-maximizing bureaucrat" who faces many incentives to seek government money beyond what is needed to provide services. If additional public money is available, this budget-maximizing bureaucrat will devote resources (that is, the organization will engage in lobbying and other political activity) in an effort to secure it. Mueller developed this concept with respect to government bureaucrats seeking money for their agencies from legislatures, but it seems applicable to nonprofit executives as well.

SUMMARY

We surely have not identified every mechanism by which government funding might increase or decrease nonprofit political activity.⁹ The mechanisms we have identified, however, ought to be sufficient to conclude that, even as government funding sets in motion processes likely to decrease nonprofits' political activities, it also sets in motion processes likely to increase such activities. Which set of processes outweighs the other, in the aggregate, forms the empirical question we address.

Figure 1 summarizes the mechanisms discussed above. Government funding sets two competing causal paths in motion. One, the path through arrows a and b in Figure 1, will tend to decrease nonprofit political activity; the other path, through arrows c and d in Figure 1, will tend to increase nonprofit political activity. Theory and research about nonprofit organizations imply that both of these paths are operative, but no extant research establishes the relative strength of these paths. We do not have adequate measures of relevant intervening variables, so we cannot assess the relative importance of the specific mechanisms associated with each path, nor can we estimate the magnitude of the effects associated with arrows a through d. We have drawn a black box around this part of the diagram to indicate that we are unable to investigate its inner workings.

We are able, however, to observe covariation between the government funding going into this box and the nonprofit political activity coming

out of the box, and so we can assess whether the path by which government funding suppresses nonprofit political activity is stronger, weaker, or balanced by the path by which government funding enhances nonprofit political activity. In terms of Figure 1, our empirical task is to determine whether the sign attached to arrow e is negative, positive, or null.

Assessing the total effect of government funding on the likelihood of engaging in political activity is complicated, of course, by prior variables that might produce a spurious correlation between government funding and political activity. The most important prior variable, represented at the bottom of Figure 1, is the underlying inclination of an organization to engage civil society, political processes, and the state. This sort of inclination could lead organizations both to seek government funds and to engage in more political activity, and it could produce a positive correlation between these two organizational behaviors, even when there is no causal connection between them. It also could produce a null correlation, even if the true causal effect is negative.

Our analyses address this concern in three ways. First, and most directly, in each data set we construct a community involvement scale intended to proxy an organization's underlying tendency to engage with civil society, political processes, and the state, and we include that variable as a control in all analyses. This is a strong control in regressions of political activity on government funding, and including it increases our confidence that any observed positive or null effects of government funding on political activity are not spuriously produced by prior variables operating in a situation where the true causal effect is negative. Second, we know a fair amount about which types of nonprofit organization are more or less likely to manifest a tendency toward community involvement, and we draw on that knowledge to introduce additional relevant control variables. Third, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the Minneapolis–St. Paul data by controlling for political activity *at time 1*, thereby investigating whether receiving government funds at time 1 predicts *change* in political activity at time 2. These longitudinal data also enable us to address the question of causal order.

Another sort of selectivity process might push the correlation between government fund-

⁹ One additional mechanism by which government funding might enhance nonprofit political activity is direct government funding of activism. This mechanism does not seem important in the 1980s and 1990s, when our data were collected, but we mention it here because of its historical importance. Several War on Poverty federal programs of the 1960s, such as the Community Action Program and the Legal Services Program, set out to directly fund community organizing and advocacy efforts in poor neighborhoods (Haveman 1977). In recent decades, the federal government has been more concerned about limiting nonprofit political activity than facilitating it, though in the 1990s, "rights-oriented advocacy groups" large enough to report their activity to the IRS still received, on average, 26 percent of their revenue from government (Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998:496).




Figure 1. The Relationship between Government Funding and Nonprofit Political Activity

ing and political activity in a negative direction. Since government funds are more likely to directly support services than to encourage advocacy, government-supported nonprofits might be less politically engaged simply because politically inactive organizations self-select into government funding streams—not because government funding sets in motion any of the causal paths we describe above. We are less concerned with this sort of self-selection. If we have misspecified our models by omitting variables that measure an organization’s prior tendency to both seek government funds and *refrain* from political activity, then our government funding coefficients would be biased downward and the effects of government funding would be more positive than we observe. This possibility does not threaten our substantive conclusions.

We analyze the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity in two distinct data sets: a national sample of congregations and a longitudinal sample of Minneapolis–St. Paul nonprofits in several sectors. These data concern very different organizational populations, and they measure political

activity and government funding in different ways. The results they yield, however, are strikingly consistent.

ANALYSIS

GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG CONGREGATIONS

SAMPLE. This analysis uses data from the National Congregations Study (NCS), a survey of a nationally representative sample of religious congregations in the United States. The NCS gathered data via a 60-minute interview with one key informant—a minister, priest, rabbi, or other leader—from 1,236 congregations. The cooperation rate was 85 percent; the response rate was 80 percent.

The probability that a congregation appears in this sample is proportional to its size. Because congregations entered the sample by being named by respondents to the 1998 General Social Survey (GSS) who attend religious services, larger congregations are more likely to appear in the sample than are smaller congregations. Some congregations were nominated by

more than one GSS respondent. Weighted only to account for duplicate nominations, univariate statistics from the NCS describe the characteristics of congregations in terms of the numbers of religious service attendees who attend congregations with those characteristics. In this case each *attendee* is given equal weight. When the data are weighted inversely proportional to congregation size, however, each *congregation* is given equal weight, regardless of its size, and univariate statistics describe the characteristics of congregations as establishments. Both kinds of numbers are substantively interesting, and we report descriptive statistics from both the individual and congregation perspectives.¹⁰

DEPENDENT VARIABLES. The NCS contains data on eight types of political activity: (1) whether people at worship services have been told, within the past 12 months, of opportunities for political activity, including petitioning campaigns, lobbying, or demonstrating; (2) whether voter guides have ever been distributed to people through the congregation; (3) whether the congregation had a group, meeting, class, or event, within the past 12 months, to organize or participate in a demonstration or march to support or oppose a public issue or policy, (4) to register people to vote, (5) to discuss politics, or (6) to organize or participate in efforts to lobby elected officials of any sort; and whether, within the past 12 months, (7) an elected official or (8) anyone running for office spoke to the congregation. All of these variables are dichotomously coded.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. Our key independent variable is whether a congregation received any funds from local, state, or federal government in support of their social service activities.¹¹ Overall, 3 percent of congregations received government funds in 1998 in support of their social service activities.

As noted earlier, we wish to control for congregations' underlying inclination to engage with the world around them, which would make them more likely both to receive funds from government and to be politically active. In an attempt to directly control for a congregation's underlying tendency to engage with its community, we construct a community involvement measure that is the first factor extracted from a factor analysis of seven variables: (1) the number of social service programs sponsored by the congregation, (2) whether the congregation has planned or conducted an assessment of community needs, (3) whether someone from a social service agency has been a visiting speaker, (4) whether the congregation has held an event to organize or encourage people to do volunteer work, (5) whether an academic or professor has been a visiting speaker, (6) whether an outside group, program, or event has used space in the congregation's building, and (7) whether the congregation has conducted or used a community survey.¹² A value of 0 on this measure means that a congregation has an average level of community involvement as reflected by these seven activities; a value of 1 means that its level of community involvement is one standard deviation above the average.

We also control for a variety of other congregational characteristics related to congregations' inclination to seek government money and be politically active. Liberal and moderate Protestant congregations are more likely to be civically engaged than are conservative and evangelical Protestant congregations; Catholic congregations fall in between (Chaves 2004, chap. 4). Consequently, we distinguish among three religious traditions: Roman Catholic, moderate/liberal Protestant, and conservative/evangelical Protestant. The distinction between moderate/liberal and conservative/evangelical moderate Protestants is drawn in standard fashion.¹³

¹² Each of these items asked about the congregation's activity over the past year.

¹³ The largest groups in the moderate/liberal Protestant category are: United Methodist Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Episcopal Church, and United Church of Christ. The largest groups in the conservative/evangelical Protestant category are:

¹⁰ See Chaves et al. (1999) for more details about NCS data and methods.

¹¹ Analyses using the percentage of a congregation's operating budget coming from government sources as the key independent variable yield results substantively similar to those reported here.

These categories, based on denominational affiliation, do not exhaust the religious differences associated with congregations' underlying tendency to engage the world around them. Another indicator of religious culture that cross-cuts these religious traditions is a congregation's theological orientation, measured by the following item: "Theologically speaking, would your congregation be considered more on the conservative side, more on the liberal side, or right in the middle?" Although much of the liberal/conservative variation among congregations is represented by differences in denomination-based religious traditions, there also is substantial theological variation within denominations. This variation, over and above denominational affiliation, is associated with a congregation's likelihood of being civically engaged: Self-described liberal congregations are more engaged than are self-described conservative congregations, whatever their denominations. We therefore include as controls two dummy variables based on this item.

We also know from previous research that predominantly African American congregations are more likely than are predominantly white congregations to be engaged in certain key kinds of political activities, and they also are more likely to be open to government collaboration and funding (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Chaves 1999). We therefore include a control for a congregation's racial composition: a dichotomous variable coded 1 for all congregations in which at least 80 percent of the regular participants are African American.

Congregations are aggregations of individuals as well as more or less formally constituted organizations. Since it is likely that congregations' activities largely reflect the preferences and activities of the people in them, it is important to control variables known to be associat-

ed with more civically engaged individuals. Relevant variables include the percent of a congregation's people with four-year college or higher degrees (logged), with household incomes over \$100,000 in 1998 (logged), who are under age 35 (logged), and who are over age 60 (logged). We also include dummy variables indicating location in the south or in a city.

Finally, congregations with more organizational capacity are more likely both to seek government funding and be politically active, so we include controls indicating several aspects of organizational capacity: size (logged number of regular participants), founding date, and whether the head clergyperson has at least a four-year college degree.

ANALYSIS STRATEGY. We estimate eight logistic regressions. Each model uses all cases with nonmissing data on the dependent variable. When there are missing data on independent variables, mean values (in the case of continuous variables) or zeros (in the case of dummy variables) are substituted. Missing value indicators are then included in each model to confirm that this strategy does not affect the substantive results.¹⁴

The logistic regressions use nonweighted data, and we used diagnostic tests recommended by Winship and Radbill (1994) to look for misspecification error related to the probability-proportional-to-size feature of the sample. These tests indicated that, although interaction terms involving size should be included in several of our models, the coefficients attached to the government-funding variable are never substantively altered by including these interactions. Including all of these terms would unnecessarily complicate the presentation of our results, so we leave them out.

RESULTS. Table 1 presents bivariate crosstabulations comparing the rate of engagement in political activity among congregations with and without government funds. The first two columns present this comparison for *individuals* in religious congregations (that is, weight-

Southern Baptist Convention, Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, and Assemblies of God. There are 50 congregations in the NCS that are either non-Christian or of indeterminate religious affiliation. This set of 50 congregations includes Jewish synagogues, Moslem mosques, and Buddhist temples, as well as other types of congregations. A dummy variable indicating this non-Christian category is included in the models, but we do not report its coefficient because the heterogeneity in the category renders the coefficient substantively meaningless.

¹⁴ Models that exclude all cases with missing data on any variable yield results substantively similar to those reported below.

Table 1. Congregations' Political Activity by Receipt of Government Funds: National Congregations Study, 1998

Variable	People in Congregations of Each Funding Type that also Do Political Activity (%)		Congregations of Each Funding Type that also Do Political Activity (%)	
	With Government Funding	Without Government Funding	With Government Funding	Without Government Funding
Told people at worship services about opportunities for political activity	64**	36	34	26
Have ever distributed voter guides	43*	26	13	17
Have had a group, meeting, class or event to:				
Organize or participate in a demonstration or march	52**	21	31	9
Get people registered to vote	36**	11	13	
Discuss politics	41**	12	6	7
Organize or participate in efforts to lobby elected officials of any sort	39**	11	6	5
Have had as a visiting speaker:				
Someone running for office	16**	6	19	4
An elected government official	33**	12	13	6
Participated in at least one of the above eight political activities	86**	60	59	41

Note: Chi-square tests were performed only for the differences in the "percent of people" part of the table. The numbers in the "percent of congregations" part of the table use data weighted to undo the probability-proportional-to-size feature of the NCS sample. It is not appropriate to calculate chi-square tests for data weighted in this way.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

ing the data only to account for duplicate nominations of congregations); the second two columns present the comparison for religious congregations as organizational units without respect to size (that is, applying a weight that undoes the probability-proportional-to-size nature of the sample). The picture is clear. On all eight items, people in congregations that receive government funds are significantly more likely than are people in congregations without such funding to be from congregations that also engage in that kind of political activity. In every case the difference is sizeable and statistically significant. The table's bottom line tells the basic story. Eighty-six percent of people in congregations with government funds are from congregations that engaged in at least one of these political activities, compared with only 60 percent of people in congregations without government funds.

The picture does not change much when we look at congregations as organizational units

without respect to size. Here, 59 percent of congregations with government funds have engaged in at least one of these political activities, compared with only 41 percent of congregations without government funds. The bivariate difference remains substantial for 5 of the 8 items.¹⁵ Overall, congregations with government funding appear to be *more* engaged in politics than do congregations without such funding.

This basic pattern is sustained by the multivariate results reported in Table 2. There is much that is interesting in this table, but the primary results, and the ones relevant for our argument, appear in the first row. Receiving government funding for social service activity

¹⁵ A substantially reduced difference when applying the weight indicates an interaction between size and receipt of government funds in their relationship with those particular political activities.

does *not* make congregations less politically active, even when controlling for a variety of relevant prior variables, including a community involvement scale that is strongly associated with each political activity.¹⁶ All the government funding coefficients are positive; four are significant at least at the $p < .05$ level. A fifth coefficient (in the "political opportunities" model) approaches significance ($p = .065$). And the magnitude of these effects is notable: Controlling for other things, congregations receiving government funds are more than three times more likely to organize a demonstration or march, for example, than are congregations without government funds.

Interpreted liberally, these results suggest that, at least for the political activities we have measured, congregations receiving government funding engage in *more* political activity than do congregations receiving no government funding, even with relevant variables controlled. Interpreted more conservatively, this set of results makes clear that congregations receiving government funding engage in *no less* political activity than congregations without that support. There is no evidence here that government funding of human service activities suppresses congregation-based political activity.

GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TWIN CITY NONPROFITS

SAMPLE. This analysis uses data from a longitudinal study of 501(c)(3) organizations in the Minneapolis–St. Paul metropolitan area. In 1980, Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld (1998) drew a one-in-five stratified systematic sample of 326 nonprofits headquartered in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. The sampling frame was developed using the *Cumulative List of Organizations* published by the Internal Revenue Service; neither congregations nor private foundations were included in the sampling frame. Data were obtained from 229 organizations, a response rate of 70 percent. Researchers returned to the field in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1994, interviewing 201, 174, 162, and 156 panel

survivors, respectively. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the chief executive officer or top administrator of each organization. Those organizations that were small and/or new were most likely to leave the panel (see Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998 for more detail on this data).

DEPENDENT VARIABLES. Two indicators of nonprofits' political activity are available in these data. Our primary dependent variable is the yes/no response to an item asking whether the organization "had engaged in lobbying efforts on your own" in the previous four years. This question was asked in 1984, 1988, and 1992. In 1994, respondents were asked about lobbying over the past two years. The question was not asked in 1980. In 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1994, 23 percent, 24 percent, 23 percent, and 29 percent of informants, respectively, said that their organization had engaged in lobbying during the relevant time interval.

The other measure of nonprofits' political activity is a scale ranging from 0 to 3, indicating whether organizations had launched major public or community relations efforts aimed at politicians, government agencies, or legislative bodies. Informants reported the presence or absence of efforts for each of these three targets; the scale sums "yes" responses (yes = 1). This measure is available only for 1984 and 1988.¹⁷

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. As in the congregations analysis above, the key independent variable is receipt of government funding. Organizational informants reported the amounts of money their organization received from city, county, state, and federal sources for 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. Grants and contracts were included, but reimbursements for Medicaid or Medicare were not. The amounts received were converted into 1994 dollars, and two-year averages were calculated to smooth year-to-year fluctuations. Thus we have data on the amount of money each organization received from four different government sources for five two-year

¹⁶ Including the community involvement scale in the models reduces the magnitude of the government funding coefficient, on average, by 25 percent.

¹⁷ The mean of this political activity scale is .831 (SD = 1.13) for 1984 and .977 (SD = 1.18) for 1988. The reliability coefficients (alphas) are .792 for 1984 and .784 for 1988.

Table 2. Logistic Regressions of Congregations' Political Activities on Presence/Absence of Governmental Funding: National Congregations Study, 1998

Independent Variables	Political Opportunities	Distribute Voter Guides	Group to Demonstrate	Voter Registration	Discuss Politics	Group to Lobby	Candidate as Speaker	Elected Official as Speaker
Government Funding (dummy variable)	.656 (.356)	.284 (.355)	1.268** (.386)	1.036* (.412)	.881* (.417)	.814* (.390)	.695 (.556)	.493 (.445)
Religious Traditions ^a								
Mainline Protestant	.047 (.190)	-.690** (.208)	-.513* (.260)	-.059 (.311)	.635* (.293)	.243 (.327)	.269 (.371)	.028 (.276)
Roman Catholic	.621** (.201)	-.840** (.220)	1.171** (.240)	.388 (.306)	-.096 (.328)	1.035** (.320)	-1.187* (.546)	-.786* (.338)
Theological Orientation ^b								
Conservative	.010 (.226)	.233 (.250)	.727* (.320)	.496 (.344)	-.776** (.297)	.009 (.344)	.460 (.455)	-.288 (.311)
Moderate	-.193 (.222)	-.256 (.252)	.523 (.314)	.028 (.339)	-.481 (.278)	.276 (.325)	.096 (.450)	-.326 (.298)
Demographic Variables								
Percent with B.A. (logged)	.074 (.183)	-.337 (.195)	.216 (.251)	-.435 (.286)	.211 (.319)	.075 (.309)	-.525 (.410)	.220 (.320)
Percent rich (logged)	-.184 (.159)	-.104 (.176)	-.188 (.202)	-.166 (.252)	-.023 (.248)	-.086 (.245)	.418 (.358)	-.069 (.251)
Size (logged)	.172 (.155)	.602** (.169)	.240 (.192)	.776** (.241)	.737** (.243)	.479 (.244)	.773* (.322)	.762** (.237)
Percent young (logged)	-.240 (.253)	.473 (.295)	1.326** (.406)	.742 (.475)	.058 (.435)	.494 (.477)	-.822 (.562)	.365 (.437)
Percent old (logged)	-.230 (.203)	-.223 (.222)	-.286 (.273)	-.261 (.323)	-.071 (.336)	.022 (.358)	.137 (.441)	.731* (.355)
More than 80% African-American	.706** (.212)	.099 (.227)	.196 (.278)	2.179** (.282)	.881** (.318)	.582 (.338)	2.498** (.366)	1.436** (.288)
South	-.217 (.138)	-.410** (.151)	.013 (.179)	-.346 (.227)	-.411 (.225)	-.373 (.236)	.128 (.301)	.532* (.211)
Urban	.067 (.149)	.025 (.161)	.284 (.195)	.614* (.266)	.655* (.258)	.589* (.257)	.342 (.379)	.163 (.243)
Clergy with college degree ^c	.055 (.161)	.138 (.174)	.233 (.214)	-.573* (.248)	-.063 (.264)	-.147 (.273)	-.400 (.355)	-.359 (.249)
Founding date	-.001 (.001)	.002 (.002)	.000 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.003 (.002)	-.004* (.002)	-.005 (.003)	-.004 (.002)

Table 2. (Continued.)

Independent Variables	Political Opportunities	Distribute Voter Guides	Group to Demonstrate	Voter Registration	Discuss Politics	Group to Lobby	Candidate as Speaker	Elected Official as Speaker
Community Involvement Scale	.476** (.079)	.375** (.085)	.680** (.101)	.781** (.122)	.773** (.124)	.676** (.127)	.724** (.171)	.801** (.123)
Constant	.944 (2.879)	-6.374 (3.282)	-4.500 (3.792)	-2.605 (4.708)	.252 (4.297)	3.003 (4.399)	4.212 (6.192)	1.259 (4.297)
-2 log likelihood	1465.020	1291.565	989.135	708.325	722.674	697.044	404.096	725.023
Congregations (N)	1,224	1,225	1,228	1,230	1,231	1,229	1,210	1,211

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The models include additional dummy variables indicating missing data on theological orientation, percent with BA degree, percent rich, percent young, percent old, clergy education, founding date, government funding, and the community involvement scale.

^a The reference category is conservative Protestant. The set of dummy variables also includes a variable indicating a residual category that is not Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, or conservative Protestant. It is included in the models only so that the religious tradition reference category is meaningful; its coefficients are not reported.

^b The reference category is theologically liberal.

^c The reference category is non-college educated clergy. A dummy variable for no clergy is also included, but the coefficient is not reported.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)

periods: 1979–1980, 1983–1984, 1987–1988, 1991–1992, and 1993–1994. Forty-three percent of organizations received government support in 1979–1980, 47 percent in 1983–1984, 48 percent in 1987–1988, 52 percent in 1991–1992, and 53 percent in 1993–1994.

We use these data to construct three measures of government support: a dummy variable indicating if the organization received any public money, a continuous variable indicating the percent of an organization's budget coming from government sources, and a continuous variable indicating the absolute dollar amount received from government sources.¹⁸

As in the congregational analysis, it is important to control for variation in nonprofits' underlying inclination to engage with the state. For 1984 and 1988, we construct a community involvement scale from items asking about major public or community relations efforts directed at the general public, community leaders, non-government funders, or the local media. Each of these targets was asked about separately, and the scale simply sums (range = 0 to 4) the number of targets at which efforts were directed.¹⁹ Furthermore, we exploit the longitudinal nature of these data by controlling whether the organization lobbied (or directed public relations efforts at government targets) in the *previous* observation period.

We also control for other characteristics related to an organization's inclination to seek government money and be politically active. Most important, we include two measures of organizational capacity: size (dollar expenditures in millions) and age.

The organizations in this data set operate in a wide range of functional arenas, and they serve different populations. It seems likely that the connection between government funding and political activity would work differently in different subsectors of the nonprofit sector. Health and welfare organizations, for example,

¹⁸ Analyses using a set of dummy variables distinguishing receipt of funds from federal, state, county, and city sources yield results substantively similar to those reported below.

¹⁹ The mean of this community involvement scale is 1.76 (SD = 1.50) in 1984 and 1.80 (SD = 1.53) in 1988. The reliability coefficients (alphas) are .756 in 1984 and .781 in 1988.

are more likely than cultural organizations both to receive government funding and be politically active. And organizations serving clients or the general public are more likely than organizations serving members both to receive government funding and be politically active. Member-oriented organizations tend to be more insular.

To ensure that our results are not an artifact of the mix of arenas and beneficiaries represented in this particular data set, we use two sets of dummy variable controls. One set represents seven activity areas: health and welfare, education, legal services, recreation, culture, science, and housing and urban development. Respondents were asked to rank these activity areas in terms of organizational priorities; our dummy variables are coded 1 if an organization named that arena as "most important" to them. Many organizations gave a rank of 1 to more than one area, indicating that more than one area was "most important." Consequently, these seven items are not mutually exclusive, so there is no reference category. We have these data for all time periods.

Respondents also were asked "who benefits from the activities of your organization." Responses were coded into four categories: members, clients/patients/students, the public, and other/mixed.²⁰ We represent this information with three dummy variables, using member-serving organizations as the reference category.

²⁰ In some years this question was open-ended; in other years respondents were given specific response categories.

RESULTS. Table 3 presents the bivariate relationship between government funding and lobbying activity by comparing, in each interval, the organizations receiving government funds with the organizations receiving no such funds. Both for organizations that received government funding and for those that did not at time 1, we show the percentage of organizations that lobbied between time 1 and time 2. It is clear that, except for the 1988–1992 interval, organizations that had public money were significantly and substantively *more* likely to engage in lobbying activity than those that did not have public support. The relationship is in the same direction for the 1988–1992 interval, but the magnitude of the difference is smaller and does not reach statistical significance.

Table 4 presents a series of logistic regressions in which the dependent variables are the dichotomous measures of lobbying in the years prior to 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1994. With one exception, all predictor variables were lagged four years in the first three sets of results and two years in the last set of results. The exception is the community involvement scale, which was not measured after 1988. For each time period, we estimated three models: one in which the key independent variable is a dummy variable representing the presence or absence of government funding in the previous period, one in which the key independent variable is the percentage of revenue coming from government sources in the previous period, and one in which the key independent variable is the absolute dollar amount (in millions) coming from government in the previous period. We emphasize

Table 3. Nonprofits' Political Activity by Receipt of Government Funds: Nonprofit Organizations in Minneapolis-St. Paul, 1980–1994

Year	Public Funding in Stated Year	Lobbying between 1980 and 1984 (%)	Lobbying between 1984 and 1988 (%)	Lobbying between 1988 and 1992 (%)	Lobbying between 1992 and 1994 (%)
1980	No	13 (109)**	—	—	—
	Yes	35 (92)	—	—	—
1984	No	—	16 (88)*	—	—
	Yes	—	33 (86)	—	—
1988	No	—	—	20 (80)	—
	Yes	—	—	25 (80)	—
1992	No	—	—	—	17 (75)**
	Yes	—	—	—	40 (81)

Note: Numbers of cases appear in parentheses.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)

that these models include controls both for a general tendency towards community involvement and (except for model 1) whether the organization lobbied in the previous period.²¹

As in the congregational analysis, there is much interesting detail in this table, but we limit our attention to the findings (Table 4, first

²¹ Recall that we do not have data on lobbying

between 1976 and 1980 so we cannot include this control in Model 1.

Table 4. Logistic Regressions of Public Charities' Lobbying Activities on Government Funding Variables: Nonprofit Organizations in Minneapolis-St. Paul, 1984-1994

Independent Variables	Model 1 ^a			Model 2 ^a		
	Lobbying in 1984			Lobbying in 1988		
Government Funding in Previous Period						
Receives any government funding	1.006* (.417)	—	—	.553 (.502)	—	—
Percent of revenue from public sources	—	.017** (.005)	—	—	.013 (.007)	—
Amount from public sources (in \$ million)	—	—	.143 (.180)	—	—	.126 (.159)
Arena of Nonprofit Activity						
Health / welfare	.567 (.691)	.452 (.688)	.494 (.676)	.681 (.731)	.442 (.748)	.708 (.731)
Education	-.490 (.677)	-.456 (.675)	-.438 (.660)	.157 (.609)	.046 (.608)	.153 (.609)
Legal	2.232 (1.339)	1.719 (1.339)	2.394 (1.412)	1.945 (1.278)	1.714 (1.309)	1.824 (1.305)
Recreation	-7.429 (14.881)	-7.059 (15.396)	-7.338 (15.282)	1.165 (.958)	1.106 (.958)	1.053 (.949)
Culture	-.515 (.825)	-.315 (.818)	-.259 (.812)	-.204 (.774)	-.047 (.755)	-.113 (.766)
Science	-.306 (1.360)	-.423 (1.446)	-.252 (1.284)	.127 (1.673)	-.174 (1.802)	.154 (1.608)
Housing	.080 (.968)	.187 (.961)	.124 (.957)	.144 (.977)	-.063 (.996)	.137 (.986)
Intended Beneficiaries^c						
Clients	-.618 (.632)	-.614 (.649)	-.480 (.620)	.190 (.933)	.099 (.927)	.329 (.903)
Public	-.553 (.709)	-.685 (.730)	-.501 (.695)	1.541 (.952)	1.492 (.950)	1.561 (.945)
Mixed	-.149 (.782)	-.085 (.784)	-.173 (.768)	2.012* (1.010)	2.142* (1.005)	2.142* (.986)
Other Controls						
Age	-.011 (.011)	-.005 (.011)	-.014 (.013)	.006 (.010)	.009 (.010)	.005 (.011)
Expenditures (in millions)	-.005 (.026)	-.002 (.024)	-.009 (.026)	.001 (.022)	.004 (.021)	.000 (.026)
Community involvement scale ^d	.461** (.145)	.467** (.145)	.525** (.142)	.394* (.155)	.408* (.158)	.410** (.155)
Lobbying in previous period	—	—	—	1.215* (.477)	1.115* (.479)	1.308** (.471)
Constant	-2.177** (.804)	-2.178** (.802)	-1.854* (.772)	-3.961** (1.129)	-3.876** (1.136)	-3.849** (1.141)
-2 log likelihood	170.797	166.388	176.217	150.853	146.916	151.424
Number of organizations	198	198	198	173	172	173

(continued on next page)

Table 4. (Continued.)

Independent Variables	Model 3 ^a			Model 4 ^b		
	Lobbying in 1992			Lobbying in 1994		
Government Funding in Previous Period						
Receives any government funding	-.381 (.564)	—	—	1.730* (.677)	—	—
Percent of revenue from public sources	—	-.006 (.008)	—	—	.007 (.010)	—
Amount from public sources (in \$ million)	—	—	.001 (.014)	—	—	.095 (.246)
Arena of Nonprofit Activity						
Health / welfare	.297 (.733)	.280 (.732)	.333 (.733)	1.207 (.793)	1.041 (.767)	1.114 (.759)
Education	-.666 (.693)	-.624 (.691)	-.477 (.685)	1.119 (.716)	.954 (.696)	.975 (.698)
Legal	1.977 (1.123)	2.021 (1.141)	1.496 (1.042)	-1.998 (1.702)	-1.529 (1.636)	-1.338 (1.587)
Recreation	-2.262 (1.490)	-2.366 (1.486)	-2.135 (1.525)	-.261 (1.675)	-.829 (1.771)	-.880 (1.794)
Culture	-.966 (.912)	-1.026 (.909)	-1.058 (.939)	.680 (1.032)	.971 (.967)	1.042 (.972)
Science	-4.215 (20.897)	-4.192 (21.004)	-4.275 (21.047)	.009 (1.569)	-.057 (1.647)	-.099 (1.637)
Housing	-.037 (1.075)	-.014 (1.065)	-.333 (1.062)	.873 (1.730)	1.339 (1.330)	1.363 (1.323)
Intended Beneficiaries ^c						
Clients	.816 (1.575)	.938 (1.669)	.727 (1.633)	-1.067 (.997)	-1.086 (.970)	-1.036 (.956)
Public	.884 (1.612)	.930 (1.704)	.777 (1.673)	1.397 (.890)	1.151 (.847)	1.219 (.837)
Mixed	2.171 (1.650)	2.190 (1.738)	2.090 (1.702)	.082 (1.893)	-.616 (1.861)	-.722 (1.853)
Other Controls						
Age	.032** (.010)	.031** (.010)	.028** (.011)	.012 (.014)	.005 (.761)	.002 (.015)
Expenditures (in millions)	.003 (.012)	.003 (.012)	.001 (.014)	.045 (.040)	.075 (.080)	.075 (.089)
Community involvement scale ^d	.359* (.173)	.349* (.168)	.289 (.164)	-.070 (.734)	.058 (.195)	.071 (.190)
Lobbying in previous period	1.880** (.525)	1.958** (.536)	1.788** (.529)	4.192** (.764)	3.880** (.697)	3.848** (.688)
Constant	-3.976* (1.703)	-4.093* (1.785)	-3.971* (1.753)	-4.190** (1.245)	-3.216** (1.093)	-3.170** (1.094)
-2 log likelihood	116.696	116.567	115.235	91.394	97.804	98.394
Number of organizations	157	157	157	153	152	153

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

^a Independent variables are lagged four years.

^b Independent variables are lagged two years.

^c The reference category is member-serving organizations.

^d The community involvement scale is measured only in 1984 and 1988. The 1984 value is used in Model 1; the 1988 value is used in the other models.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)

three rows) directly relevant for our argument. In short, the effects of government funding on the likelihood of nonprofit lobbying are either significantly positive (3 coefficients) or null (9 coefficients). Whether expressed as a dummy variable, as the percentage of an organization's budget, or as an absolute dollar amount, receiving government money at time 1 either has no

effect on the likelihood of lobbying in subsequent years, or it increases that likelihood.

Table 5 contains a similar analysis but uses the count of public relations efforts aimed at government targets in 1988 as the dependent variable. The first three rows show that both the percentage of an organization's revenue that comes from government and the absolute dol-

Table 5. OLS Regressions of Public Relations Efforts Aimed at Government Targets (1984–1988) on Government Funding Variables: Nonprofit Organizations in Minneapolis-St. Paul

Independent Variables	Political Activity, 1984–1988		
Government Funding in Previous Period:			
Receives any government funding, 1984	.231 (.187)	—	—
Percent of revenue from public sources, 1984	—	.010** (.003)	—
Amount from public sources (in \$ millions), 1984	—	—	.211** (.064)
Arena of Nonprofit Activity (1984)			
Health / Welfare	.095 (.252)	-.136 (.246)	-.003 (.242)
Education	.041 (.223)	-.064 (.215)	-.013 (.217)
Legal	.300 (.534)	.074 (.517)	.047 (.526)
Recreation	.217 (.331)	.114 (.318)	.134 (.323)
Culture	-.480 (.289)	-.452 (.268)	-.507 (.270)
Science	.793 (.521)	.582 (.503)	.742 (.506)
Housing	.878* (.341)	.701* (.329)	.765* (.332)
Intended Beneficiaries (1984) ^a			
Clients	.005 (.259)	-.087 (.244)	.026 (.243)
Public	-.049 (.293)	-.108 (.278)	-.069 (.282)
Mixed	.245 (.324)	.234 (.307)	.282 (.307)
Other Controls			
Age, 1980	-.003 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.007 (.004)
Expenditures (in millions), 1984	-.006 (.007)	-.005 (.006)	-.008 (.007)
Community involvement scale (1984–88)	.390** (.053)	.383** (.051)	.386** (.051)
Political activity, 1984	.194** (.073)	.109 (.071)	.181** (.067)
Constant	-.048 (.330)	.120 (.318)	.134 (.325)
Adjusted R-square	.361	.415	.396
Organizations (N)	172	171	172

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

^a The reference category is member-serving organizations.

lar amount coming from government have significant positive effects on public relations efforts targeted at government.

All in all, these results are strikingly similar to the results for religious congregations. There is no evidence here that government funding of human service activities suppresses nonprofits' political activity. That relationship is either positive or null.

The possibility remains, however, that receiving government money at time 1 in part reflects an organization's self-interested lobbying at a previous point in time. We address this causal order issue by estimating a set of multiple regression equations in which the dependent variables are (1) whether the organization received public funds at time 2, (2) the total amount of income at time 2 from public sources, and (3) the percentage of income at time 2 from public sources. In each time period, each of these three dependent variables was regressed on our lobbying indicator, and then on the scale of government-directed public relations activity. That is, government income in 1984 was regressed on the organization's level of political activity between 1980 and 1984, government income in 1988 was regressed on the organization's level of political activity between 1984 and 1988, and so on. Control variables, all measured at time 1, are the same as in previous analyses, except that government funding measures at time 1 also are included. In all, we estimated 24 equations: 3 indicators of government funding regressed on each of 2 measures of political activity in each of 4 time periods. The results (table available upon request) do not paint a clear picture about whether nonprofit political activity is an effective tactic for increasing government funding. In only 5 of the 24 equations did we find a significant (at the $p < .05$ level) positive effect of lobbying on increases in a public funding stream, 1 coefficient was significantly negative, and the rest were null. These results add to our confidence that the positive effects of government funding reported in Table 4 are not wholly produced by a reversed causal order in which organizational lobbying generates government funding for nonprofits, but there is a hint of reverse causation that future research might profitably explore.

LIMITATIONS OF THE TWO ANALYSES

We find that government funding does not suppress nonprofit political activity in either the Minneapolis–St. Paul sample or the congregations sample. Perhaps, however, we fail to find evidence for suppression of this activity because of limitations on our data and analysis. We consider five potentially relevant limitations.

First, we measure only some types of political activity—eight types of political activity for congregations and two for noncongregational nonprofits. It remains possible that government funding suppresses political activities other than the specific ones we measure. A second limitation is related: We do not know the content of any of this political activity, and so we are not able to assess the extent to which nonprofit political advocacy is narrowly self-interested versus broadly public-spirited. Perhaps if we were able to distinguish self-interested from public-spirited activity we would find that government funding generally suppresses the latter but not the former.

Although we measure only some types of political activity, and although it remains possible that we have missed a type of political activity that is suppressed by government funding, our measures cover a range of activities—from lobbying to organizing demonstrations and marches to sponsoring speeches by candidates—and the consistency of our results across all of these activities provides some confidence that the patterns we observe here are not specific to any particular kind of political activity. Relatedly, although we have no direct knowledge about the specific content of any of this political activity, the results are no different for activities, like organizing demonstrations or marches, that seem more likely to be public-spirited than self-interested. Moreover, the distinction between public-spirited and self-interested action in the nonprofit arena can be difficult to draw. If a nonprofit's political activity increases the funding stream flowing to that organization, but that increased funding also means that more meals are served, more beds are provided, more job-training classes are held, and so on, it is not clear that such political activity should be considered self-serving rather than public-spirited. From this perspective, our lack of knowledge about the content of these organizations' political activity seems less limiting for our argument than it otherwise might.

A third limitation is that, with the exception of one ordinal scale, we measure only the presence or absence of each political activity, not the extent of it. It remains possible that government funding reduces the *intensity* with which nonprofits engage in political activity without reducing the likelihood that they do it at all. However, if government funding in fact generally suppressed the intensity with which organizations engaged in politics, it presumably would reduce some levels of intensity to zero, and this should have left a trace in our dichotomous measures.

Fourth, we have presented results only on *linear* relationships between the percentage of a nonprofit's revenue that comes from government and the likelihood that the nonprofit pursues political activity. But perhaps the effect of government funding on nonprofit political activity becomes decreasingly positive (but never negative) as organizational dependence on that funding source increases; or perhaps the effect of government funding on political activity actually becomes negative at high levels of organizational dependence. We looked for these nuances by including in our models either a logarithmic transformation of the percentage-of-revenue variable or its square, but we did not find consistent evidence for any sort of curvilinearity in the relationship between the percentage of an organization's revenue that comes from government and its level of political activity. This may be because we do not have enough organizations in either data set at high enough levels of dependence on government funds to discern curvilinearity.²² But even if curvilinearity exists when government funding levels are extraordinarily high, our results show that at levels of reliance on government funding characterizing the vast majority of congregations and noncongregational nonprofits, government funding does not suppress political activity.

Fifth, we have data on noncongregational nonprofits only from one metropolitan area.

Although we would not claim that the Twin Cities are representative of American cities, and although there is substantial variation across cities in the structure of the nonprofit sector, we do not see any reason to suppose that the key relationships we examine here are peculiar to the Twin Cities. Moreover, our argument does not rest on the Twin Cities data alone. We rest our argument on the consistency of results from these two very different data sets, and across several different political activities, nonprofit subsectors, and types of government entity from which nonprofits receive financial support. In light of this consistency we are less concerned than we might otherwise be about limitations applying to either of these data sets if taken alone.²³

CONCLUSION

We have engaged the complex theme of the nature and consequences of civil society's autonomy from the state by examining one sector of civil society (nonprofit organizations), one sort of dependence on government (financial), and one kind of consequence (political activity). We described mechanisms by which government funding might suppress nonprofit political activity, and we described other mechanisms by which public funding might enhance that activity. Our results suggest either that these competing mechanisms balance each other or that the mechanisms by which public funding enhances political activity are somewhat stronger. Some observers believe that the resource dependence and legal ambiguities that come with government funding decrease nonprofit political activity, but government-funded nonprofits also have incentives to be politically active—incentives that, as we noted earlier, encompass both self-interest and public spiritedness in ways difficult to disentangle. Add to these incentives government's dependency on nonprofits to deliver services, and also add other dynamics we have not elaborated, such as

²² In the congregations data, only 7 congregations received more than 10 percent of their income from government, and no congregation in this sample received more than 27 percent of its annual income from that source. In the Twin Cities data, only between 15 and 20 percent of organizations in each period received more than two thirds of their income from government.

²³ We referred earlier to the 2000 survey of a national sample of nonprofits large enough to file financial information with the IRS. This survey also found a null relationship between the percentage of an organization's budget coming from government and the extent to which it lobbies government officials (Berry 2003:90).

government's need for nonprofit expertise when it comes to formulating policy, and the result is a set of forces that seems at least to balance the resource dependencies, legal ambiguities, and other factors that push in the opposite direction. There is much to be said for "following the money" and attending to the power inequities produced by resource dependence. Nothing in this study contradicts the sociological wisdom that, all else equal, resource dependence reduces the capacity for autonomous action. But all else is not equal. When a nonprofit organization receives government funding, forces other than resource dependence are set in motion, and in the presence of such forces, resource dependence does not necessarily produce political quiescence. In this arena it appears to be a mistake to infer loss of autonomy from resource dependence.

Whatever the detailed operations of the mechanisms set in motion by government funding, these mechanisms net out to either a positive or a null effect on political activity. We are tempted to conclude that government funding in fact enhances nonprofits' political activity, but a more cautious interpretation of our results is that government funding does not suppress it. Yet even this more cautious interpretation implies that the nonprofit sector remains a viable vehicle of citizen advocacy, even in the presence of its increasing reliance on government funds to carry out its core work. At least in the specific manifestation we have examined, civil society's capacity for political action does not seem to be reduced by its increased reliance on government funding.

Our conclusion is not affected by our exclusive focus on nonprofits whose primary purpose is something other than politics—on 501(c)(3) rather than 501(c)(4) organizations. By focusing on 501(c)(3) organizations we surely have understated the extent to which nonprofits engage in political activity, but we do not see any reason that this focus should undermine our primary conclusion about the effect of government funding on nonprofit political activity. Indeed, it seems reasonable to conjecture that, if government funding does not reduce political activity among organizations for which politics is a secondary activity, neither is it likely to reduce political activity in organizations for which advocacy is the top priority. Establishing

the truth of this conjecture, however, is a task for future research.

Whatever the broadly theoretical import of our results, our congregations' results speak directly to ongoing debate concerning "charitable choice" or "faith-based" initiatives intended to direct more public funds supporting social services to religious organizations, including religious congregations. Critics of these initiatives, from both the political right and left, have expressed concern that increased government funding might threaten the mission and distinctiveness of religious organizations. Critics from the right worry that government funding might threaten what some believe to be a distinctively "holistic" approach to social services manifest in religious organizations that maintain their autonomy from government.²⁴ Critics from the left worry that congregations and other religious organizations might lose their "prophetic voice"—their capacity to engage in political activity critical of government—if they receive government funds to support their social service activities. Our results suggest that the latter criticism is largely unwarranted.

Our evidence suggests that putting more government money into the "black box" of Figure 1 does not reduce the amount of political activity coming out of the box, but we have offered only limited insight into the inner workings of that box. Given the rudimentary state of knowledge about the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity, the step we take here is a necessary early step in the effort to develop systematic knowledge about this relationship. Future research should move beyond our analysis to examine the relative importance of the various mechanisms by which government funding influences nonprofit political activity, the possibility that the relative importance of those mechanisms shifts at different levels of nonprofit dependence on government or for different types of nonprofits, and the possibility that the system changes over time as government alters the signals it gives about the propriety of nonprofit political activity. Research along these lines would contribute

²⁴ See Chaves and Tsitsos (2001) and Chaves (2004, chap. 3) for evidence contrary to this criticism from the right.

valuable new knowledge about the complex relationship between civil society's autonomy from the state and its capacity to act in the political arena.

Mark Chaves is Professor and Head of the Sociology Department at the University of Arizona. Much of his work spans the boundary between the sociology of religion and the sociology of organizations. His most recent book, Congregations in America (Harvard University Press), will appear in May, 2004.

Laura Stephens is a doctoral candidate at the University of Arizona. Her main research interests are in the areas of religion and organizations. Her dissertation examines the impact of social service involvement on religious congregations.

Joseph Galaskiewicz is Professor of Sociology and has a courtesy appointment in the School of Public Administration and Policy at the University of Arizona. He is currently doing research on the market for youth services in the Phoenix-Mesa metropolitan area with funding from the National Science Foundation. He also serves as President of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Associations and is co-editing (with Daniel Brass, Henrich Greve, and Wenpin Tsai) a special issue of the Academy of Management Journal on Building Effective Networks that will be published in late 2004.

REFERENCES

- Alexander, Jennifer, Renee Nank, and Camilla Stivers. 1999. "Implications of Welfare Reform: Do Nonprofit Survival Strategies Threaten Civil Society?" *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 28:452-75.
- Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and The Interfaith Alliance Foundation. *Keeping the Faith: The Promise of Cooperation, The Perils of Government Funding: A Guide for Houses of Worship*. N.d. Washington, DC: Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and The Interfaith Alliance Foundation.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. 2003. *A Voice for Nonprofits*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Beyerlein, Kraig and Mark Chaves. 2003. "The Political Activities of Religious Congregations in the United States." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42:229-46.
- Boris, Elizabeth and Rachel Mosher-Williams. 1998. "Nonprofit Advocacy Organizations: Assessing the Definitions, Classifications, and Data." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 27:488-506.
- Boris, Elizabeth and Jeff Krehely. 2002. "Civic Participation and Advocacy." Pp. 299-330 in *The State of Nonprofit America*, edited by L.M. Salamon. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Boris, Elizabeth and C. Eugene Steuerle, eds. 1999. *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Brody, Evelyn and Joseph J. Cordes. 1999. "Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-Edged Sword?" Pp. 141-76 in *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict*, edited by E.T. Boris and C.E. Steuerle. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Chaves, Mark. 1999. "Religious Congregations and Welfare Reform: Who Will Take Advantage of 'Charitable Choice'?" *American Sociological Review* 64:836-46.
- . 2004. *Congregations in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chaves, Mark, Mary Ellen Konieczny, Kraig Beyerlein, and Emily Barman. 1999. "The National Congregations Study: Background, Methods, and Selected Results." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38:458-76.
- Chaves, Mark and William Tsitsos. 2001. "Congregations and Social Services: What They Do, How They Do It, and with Whom." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 30:660-83.
- Duitch, Suri. N.d. *Speak Up: Tips on Advocacy for Publicly Funded Nonprofits*. New York: Center for an Urban Future.
- Fish, John Hall. 1973. *Black Power/White Control: The Struggle of the Woodlawn Organization in Chicago*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Froelich, Karen A. 1999. "Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 28:246-68.
- Galaskiewicz, Joseph. 1985. "Interorganizational Relations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 11:281-304.
- Galaskiewicz, Joseph and Wolfgang Bielefeld. 1998. *Nonprofit Organizations in an Age of Uncertainty: A Study of Organizational Change*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Gittell, Marilyn. 1980. *Limits to Citizen Participation: The Decline of Community Organizations*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Greene, Sarah. M. 2003. Letter to Windy Hill, May 28, 2003. National Head Start Association, Alexandria, VA. Retrieved June 12, 2003 (www.saveheadstart.org/052003release.html).
- Grønbjerg, Kristen A. 1993. *Understanding Nonprofit Funding: Managing Revenues in Social Services and Community Development Organizations*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
- . 2002. "Evaluating Nonprofit Databases." *American Behavioral Scientist* 45:1741-77.
- Hallett, Joe. 2002. "Ohio Kids Gain New Advocate." *The Columbus Dispatch*, April 21, p. 1C.

- Harris, Fredrick C. 2001. "Black Churches and Civic Traditions: Outreach, Activism, and the Politics of Public Funding of Faith-Based Ministries." Pp. 140–54 in *Can Charitable Choice Work? Covering Religion's Impact on Urban Affairs and Social Services*, edited by A. Walsh. Hartford, CT: Leonard E. Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life.
- Haveman, Robert H., ed. 1977. *A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs: Achievements, Failures, and Lessons*. New York: Academic Press.
- Helfgot, Joseph H. 1974. "Professional Reform Organizations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor." *American Sociological Review* 39:475–91.
- Hill, Windy M. 2003. Letter to Head Start Providers, May 8, 2003. Head Start Bureau, Administration for Children and Families, United States Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC. Retrieved June 12, 2003 (www.saveheadstart.org/052003release.html).
- Hudson, Alan. 2002. "Advocacy by UK-Based Development NGOs." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 31:402–18.
- Jenkins, J. Craig. 1987. "Nonprofit Organizations and Policy Advocacy." Pp. 296–318 in *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, edited by W.W. Powell. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kramer, Ralph M. 1981. *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 1987. "Voluntary Agencies and the Personal Social Services." Pp. 240–57 in *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, edited by W.W. Powell. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kramer, Ralph M. and Bart Grossman. 1987. "Contracting for Social Services: Process Management and Resource Dependencies." *Social Service Review* 61:32–55.
- Matthews, Nancy A. 1994. *Confronting Rape: The Feminist Anti-Rape Movement and the State*. New York: Routledge.
- Monsma, Stephen V. 1996. *When Sacred and Secular Mix: Religious Nonprofit Organizations and Public Money*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Mueller, Dennis C. 1979. *Public Choice*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Netting, F. Ellen. 1982. "Secular and Religious Funding of Church-Related Agencies." *Social Service Review* 56:586–604.
- Nowland-Foreman, Garth. 1998. "Purchase-of-Service Contracting, Voluntary Organizations, and Civil Society." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42:108–23.
- O'Regan, Katherine and Sharon Oster. 2002. "Does Government Funding Alter Nonprofit Governance? Evidence from New York City Nonprofit Contractors." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 21:359–79.
- Reid, Elizabeth J. 1999. "Nonprofit Advocacy and Political Participation." Pp. 291–327 in *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict*, edited by E.T. Boris and C.E. Steuerle. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
- Ryan, William P., Frederick T. Miller, and Dorothy Weiss. 2002. "Government Funding of Nonprofit Human-Service Organizations: A Review of Challenges and Opportunities." New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Unpublished manuscript.
- Saidel, Judith R. 1991. "Resource Interdependence: The Relationship between State Agencies and Nonprofit Organizations." *Public Administration Review* 51:543–53.
- Salamon, Lester M. 1995. *Partners in Public Service: Government (Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2002. "The Resilient Sector: The State of Nonprofit America." Pp. 3–61 in *The State of Nonprofit America*, edited by L.M. Salamon. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1999. "Advocates without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life." Pp. 461–509 in *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, edited by T. Skocpol and M. Fiorina. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution; New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Smith, Steven Rathgeb. 1989. "Federal Funding, Nonprofit Agencies, and Victim Services." Pp. 215–27 in *Services for Sale: Purchasing Health and Human Services*, edited by H.W. Demone Jr. and M. Gibelman. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- . 1999. "Government Financing of Nonprofit Activity." Pp. 177–211 in *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict*, edited by E.T. Boris and C.E. Steuerle. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Smith, Steven Rathgeb and M. Lipsky. 1993. *Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stone, Melissa Middleton. 1996. "Competing Contexts: The Evolution of a Nonprofit Organization's Governance System in Multiple Environments." *Administration and Society* 28:61–89.
- Wallis, Jim. 2001. "Will Aid Make Churches Docile?" Op-Ed. *New York Times*, February 3, p. A13.
- Winship, Christopher and Larry Radbill. 1994. "Sampling Weights and Regression Analysis." *Sociological Methods and Research* 23:230–57.
- Wolch, Jennifer R. 1990. *The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition*. New York: Foundation Center.